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ABSTRACT: After a smallpox epidemic in Germany in the early 1870s in the wake of the Franco-German War, smallpox vaccination 
became compulsory by Imperial Law in 1874. The act was hotly debated in parliament and in public and earlier resistance against 
vaccination developed into a political anti-vaccination movement. For this reason, the German government adopted a number of 
safety measures. The current article describes, firstly, vaccination practices, regulations and policies in the German states up to the 
1870s and the biopolitical developments that led to the Imperial Law on compulsory smallpox vaccination in 1874. Secondly, the 
article sketches the public debate and critique regarding vaccination asking why compulsory vaccination succeeded in Germany. 
The article describes the measures implemented by the German government to promote compulsory vaccination and acceptance 
of the Imperial Law: initially, smallpox vaccines were manufactured by state-run production sites and supervised by local authori-
ties. Empire-wide statistics were collated documenting the success of vaccination as well as related side-effects. From a government 
perspective, these precautions could be interpreted as a technology of trust.
KEY WORDS: Smallpox; vaccination; 19th Century-German Empire; medical statistics; public health.
LA VACUNA CONTRA LA VIRUELA EN EL IMPERIO ALEMÁN. LA VACUNACIÓN ENTRE BIOPOLÍTICA Y 
ECONOMÍA MORAL.
RESUMEN: Después de una epidemia de viruela en Alemania a principios de la década de 1870 a raíz de la guerra francoalemana, 
la vacuna antivariólica se hizo obligatoria por Ley Imperial en 1874. La ley se debatió acaloradamente en el parlamento y en pú-
blico, y la resistencia ya existente contra la vacunación se convirtió en un movimiento político antivacunas. Por ello, el gobierno 
alemán adoptó una serie de medidas de seguridad. El artículo actual describe, en primer lugar, las prácticas, regulaciones y políti-
cas de vacunación en los estados alemanes hasta la década de 1870, y los desarrollos biopolíticos que llevaron a la Ley Imperial 
sobre la vacunación antivariólica obligatoria en 1874. En segundo lugar, se esbozan el debate público y la crítica sobre la vacunación, 
preguntando por qué la vacunación obligatoria tuvo éxito en Alemania. Se describen las medidas aplicadas por el gobierno alemán 
para promover la vacunación obligatoria y la aceptación de la Ley Imperial: inicialmente, las vacunas contra la viruela se fabricaban 
por centros de producción estatales supervisados por las autoridades locales. Se recopilaban estadísticas de todo el imperio que 
documentaban el éxito de la vacunación, así como los efectos secundarios relacionados. Desde la perspectiva del gobierno, estas 
precauciones podrían interpretarse como una tecnología de confianza.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Viruela, vacunación, Imperio alemán del siglo XIX, estadística médica, higiene pública.
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On 6 June 1909, a young boy from Elberfeld, Willy 
Otto, died after he had come down with a feverish 
rash, followed by pneumonia and cerebral inflamma-
tion. The boy had been vaccinated against smallpox 
in mid-May and critics quickly attributed his death, 
like that of many others, to his vaccination. The Ger-
man anti-vaccination movement misused the boy’s 
death in their own agitation against compulsory 
vaccination.2 
After a smallpox epidemic in the early 1870s fol-
lowing the Franco-German War, smallpox vaccination 
became compulsory in the German Empire. During 
the public debate about the law and after the intro-
duction of compulsory vaccination in 1874, the an-
ti-vaccination movement became increasingly influ-
ential as a social group, comprising an important part 
of the so-called medizinkritische Bewegung (a social 
movement including life-reform activists or natural 
healers who criticised scientific medicine). But neither 
the death of Willy Otto, nor other casualties and pro-
tests about the procedure, had any effect on com-
pulsory vaccination, which remained in force until the 
1970s. Why were these critics so unsuccessful?
More than twenty years ago, Eberhard Wolff cited 
the case of Willy Otto in his study about the anti-vac-
cination movement in Germany (Wolff, 1998). Wolff 
focussed mainly on the opponents of vaccination, 
comparing their claims to those of the vaccinators. 
By contrast, the following article will take a closer 
look at the state’s abiding role in implementing vac-
cination programs. 
Peter Baldwin has described the reactions of vari-
ous European states to the threat of contagious dis-
eases between 1830 and 1930 and has analysed dif-
ferences in the implementation of public healthcare 
policies. In the case of smallpox epidemics, Baldwin 
embeds the politics of prevention in a broader so-
cio-cultural and political context, concluding that a 
clear national style is difficult to identify – and this 
applies in particular for the German states (Baldwin, 
1999, esp. pp. 548-556). Histories of smallpox epi-
demics and prevention, like inoculation and vaccina-
tion, focus mainly on Britain – and for good reason: 
Lady Mary Wortley Montague first adopted (and pop-
ularized) Middle Eastern techniques of inoculation to 
Britain, and Edward Jenner established and propagat-
ed the technique of vaccination in Britain at the end 
of the 18th century; furthermore, the English anti-vac-
cination movement became a role model for other 
groups in Europe.3 Soon, inoculation and vaccination 
practices were adopted in German territories and 
vaccination became and remained compulsory,4 in 
spite of much scepticism as well as political and social 
resistance. But the history of smallpox epidemics and 
prevention (especially) in Germany has only rarely 
been described in detail5 and only incorporated into 
larger histories of epidemics (or immunisation).6 A 
recent study on immunisation in Germany focuses on 
public discourses (of medicalization) and broader so-
cial and cultural aspects of immunisation.7 However, 
on a practical level, little is known about the produc-
tion, regulation, and distribution of smallpox vaccines 
in Germany. And so the following article provides an 
overview of the history of the smallpox vaccine, spe-
cifically its production and state regulation in 19th 
century Germany. I will discuss and revisit the entan-
gled relationship between the state and public health-
care8 and describe how German states and the Ger-
man Empire sought to control the risks posed by 
contagious diseases like smallpox. Specifically, I will 
examine the introduction of compulsory vaccination, 
delineate how governmental authorities reacted to 
criticism and resistance, and finally answer the ques-
tion of why compulsory vaccination wasn’t aban-
doned and its critics unsuccessful. While taking stock 
of the existing literature, the article also relies on 
contemporary sources published by the Imperial 
Health Office. Although the article first explores the 
establishment of vaccination in Germany around 
1800, it focuses on the last third of the 19th 
century.
After exploring vaccination practices, regulations, 
and healthcare policy in the German states up until 
the 1870s, I will summarize the biopolitical rationale 
behind the Imperial Law on compulsory smallpox vac-
cination in 1874. Thereafter, I will sketch the public 
debate about the law and describe the sanctions im-
posed by the German government in support of the 
law’s implementation and public acceptance. Finally, 
I will assess the safety measures put in place to re-
duce public health risks and analyse the moral econ-
omy of vaccination in Germany.
1.  SMALLPOX VACCINATION IN THE GERMAN 
STATES BEFORE 1870
As elsewhere in Europe, in 18th century Germany 
smallpox was well-known and feared as a major 
threat to individual and public health, as well as to 
public order. At least two third of the population had 
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contracted smallpox, which especially afflicted chil-
dren (Huerkamp, 1985; Vasold, 1991, p. 181; Winkle, 
1997; Wolff, 1998, p. 101). Mortality rates in German 
territories occasionally rose to between twenty and 
thirty per cent, and in the last decades of the 18th 
century an estimated 60,000 to 70,000 people died 
annually of smallpox (Huerkamp, 1985, p. 621; Wolff, 
1998, p. 101). 
But the disease was feared not just because of its 
high mortality rates, but especially because of its dis-
tressing symptoms, including painful and itching nod-
ules that mutated into pustules that could cover the 
entire body and sometimes even induce blindness. 
Because of its severity, efforts had been undertaken 
since antiquity to prevent smallpox’s onset or at least 
alleviate its symptoms. Dating back to early modern 
times in the Middle East, where smallpox was endem-
ic, laymen and especially older peasant women ap-
plied fresh lymph or dried crusts, taken from conva-
lescing patients who had suffered a milder form of 
smallpox, under the skin of children who hadn’t yet 
been infected.9 After this procedure, the children 
tended to manifest milder symptoms, avoid severe 
pockmarks and blindness, and were considered to 
have lifelong protection against the disease.10
Lady Mary Wortley Montague observed this prac-
tice between 1716 and 1718 in Constantinople, where 
her husband served as English consul. Convinced that 
the inoculation practice worked, she had her son in-
oculated by the embassy’s surgeon. A few years after 
she and her family returned to London, England ex-
perienced a severe smallpox epidemic and she now 
also had her daughter successfully inoculated. Lady 
Montague promoted the inoculation procedure and 
in subsequent decades, despite much scepticism, va-
riolation gained wider acceptance (mainly among 
well-to-do families) (Smith, 1987; Hopkins, 2002, pp. 
47-50; Winkle, 1997, pp. 868-70). In German territo-
ries, inoculation was first practiced in the 1720s, but 
it only became more popular in the second half of 
the 18th century and it was a preventive measure 
available only to social elites.11 
Various factors and risks delayed the establishment 
and wide use of variolation. Initially, inoculation con-
ducted by a physician and often accompanied by a 
dietary regime was very expensive and unaffordable 
for most people. Furthermore, the course of disease 
after variolation was unpredictable and inoculated 
children sometimes developed severe symptoms or 
side effects and a small percentage even died. And 
although the risk was reduced, there was no guaran-
tee that inoculation would provide absolute protec-
tion against smallpox. In addition, rumours and accu-
sations abounded that variolation itself was 
responsible for the outbreak of smallpox epidemics 
(Wolff, 1998, pp. 102-8; Kübler, 1901, pp. 122-41). 
As an alternative to prevent the outbreak of small-
pox, it was observed in some areas of Britain and 
Holstein that people – mainly dairy workers – who 
had once been infected with cowpox were immune 
to smallpox. That lymph from cowpox blisters could 
be used to prevent smallpox was already known by 
the last third of the 18th century. But the medical and 
lay practice was limited to small local areas.12 It was 
only after Edward Jenner published accounts of his 
experiments on the inoculation of cowpox that vac-
cination became public knowledge. Jenner had ap-
plied material from the cowpox blisters of a dairymaid 
to the healthy boy, James Phipps. A few days later 
the boy showed local reactions at the injection site 
and typical symptoms of cowpox, but no general signs 
of illness. And after the blister disappeared, he was 
infected with smallpox matter but showed no symp-
toms of smallpox (Jenner 1798). Jenner’s experiments 
not only demonstrated that cowpox protected from 
smallpox, but also that cowpox could be transmitted 
from human to human. With the publication of his 
observations and his description of the procedure, he 
transformed lay practice into medical knowledge. De-
spite criticism from the medical community, vaccina-
tion was soon accepted and practised in Britain and 
elsewhere (cf. Crookshank, 1889; Kübler, 1901, chap. 
VII; Parish, 1965, pp. 25-7; Winkle, 1997, pp. 880-5; 
Williams, 2011).
Soon after Jenner’s publication, several physicians 
in German states, among them Samuel Thomas von 
Soemmering in Frankfurt, August Christian Reuß in 
Stuttgart, and Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland in Berlin, 
promoted vaccination within the German medical 
community and vaccinated patients themselves.13 
One of the problems facing these advocates of vac-
cination was that cowpox was not a common cattle 
disease and relatively rare. As a result, dried or con-
served cowpox lymph had to be sent to colleagues 
and often lost its potency. Not least for this reason, 
physicians also preferred to vaccinate from arm-to-
arm. Such limitation made it necessary to organize 
the entire vaccination process. In London, for in-
stance, St. George Hospital soon became a centre of 
vaccination. Elsewhere, children in orphanages were 
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used: eight days after vaccination, once one child’s 
blisters had fully developed, another child could be 
vaccinated. Physicians working as vaccinators also 
organized weekly public meetings in schools, hospi-
tals, or parish halls, where previously vaccinated peo-
ple returned for a check up and served as a new 
source for those who had not yet been (and wanted 
to be) vaccinated.14 The difficulties involved in such 
procedures help to explain two developments: First, 
the creation of private-public institutions and socie-
ties, like the Royal Jennerian Society or the London 
Vaccine Institute, in order to organize vaccinations. 
And second, the relatively slow progress made in im-
plementing vaccination procedures. For Wurttem-
berg, Eberhard Wolff has illustrated that, although 
the first vaccinations had been performed in January 
1801, it took nearly twenty years before a majority 
of children had been vaccinated and procedures were 
established to ensure comprehensive and on-going 
vaccinations.15 
State officials in Germany discussed the potential 
risks and benefits of vaccination. In Prussia’s capital 
Berlin, a so-called Royal Vaccine Institute (Königliches 
Schutzpocken-Impfungs-Institut) had been estab-
lished in 1802. The institute, first conceived as part 
of the Royal Charité Hospital, was affiliated with an 
orphanage, the Friedrichs-Waisenhaus. Under the 
auspices of the Collegio Medicio et Sanitatis, the in-
stitute vaccinated children free of charge, kept re-
cords and compiled statistics about the number of 
vaccinated children, and promoted vaccination (Kü-
bler, 1901, pp. 178-9; Münch, 1995, pp. 230-4). Other 
institutes were also established, for instance in 1804 
in the Electorate of Hesse (Landgrafschaft/Kurfürsten-
tum Hessen-Kassel) in Kassel.16 And plans to found a 
similar institution, affiliated to a hospital or an or-
phanage, had also been discussed in Wurttemberg in 
1803 and 1814, but Wolff is unsure whether these 
plans ever came to fruition (Wolff, 1998, pp. 
135-7).
Initially, German officials promoted vaccination by 
publishing brochures about its salubrious effects or 
by providing vaccination services for free. But soon 
vaccination became, direct or indirect, compulsory. 
Orphans and other children cared for in public insti-
tutions, as well as army recruits, were vaccinated if 
they had not yet been infected with smallpox or had 
already been vaccinated. In Bavaria, Baden, and West-
phalia, prospective students and apprentices had to 
been vaccinated.17 In several German states, vaccina-
tion became compulsory: in the Grand Duchy of Hes-
se (Großherzogtum Hessen-Darmstadt)18 and Bavaria 
in 1807, in Baden and the Electorate of Hesse (Land-
grafschaft/Kurfürstentum Hessen-Kassel) in 1815, in 
the Duchy of Nassau and Kingdom Wurttemberg in 
1818, and in Hannover in 1821 (Kübler, 1901, p. 179). 
State employed physicians usually acted as vaccina-
tors and mainly vaccinated cowpox from child to 
child. These medical officers also issued the vaccina-
tion certificates required by students and apprentices, 
kept records about the vaccination, compiled statis-
tics, and sometimes monitored whether all infants of 
their districts were vaccinated.
Jenner was convinced that vaccination provided 
lifelong immunity from smallpox. But in the 1820s, 
relapses occurred and people who had been vacci-
nated as children came down with smallpox. This at 
once called into question the efficacy of cow lymph 
(and especially of “humanised” cow lymph) and vac-
cines,19 but also revealed that relapses involved much 
milder forms of the disease. Hence, experts con-
firmed that vaccination protected against smallpox, 
but only for one or two decades, thus necessitating 
re-vaccination. In German territories, vaccination re-
mained commonplace and re-vaccination was recom-
mended; and in the largest German states, re-vacci-
nation of military personnel became compulsory: 
1829 in Wurttemberg, 1834 in Prussia, 1837 in Han-
nover, 1840 in Baden, followed by smaller Saxon 
states and, belatedly in 1868, in the Kingdom of Sax-
ony.20 With the exception of the army, however, only 
three (small) German states made re-vaccination 
compulsory (Hessen-Nassau, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxo-
ny-Meiningen) (Blattern und Schutzpockenimpfung, 
1896, p. 57). 
2.  THE SMALLPOX EPIDEMIC AND THE FRANCO-
PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1870/1871
By the second half of the 19th century, government 
officials had long recognized the importance of dis-
eases in wartime. The Prime Minister of Prussia and 
later German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, as well 
as leading Prussian military commanders complained 
after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 that they had 
lost more troops to cholera than to combat opera-
tions.21 In this context, the compulsory re-vaccination 
of Prussian soldiers against smallpox was first and 
foremost a measure of military strategy and planning. 
This became obvious during the Franco-Prussian War 
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in 1870/1871. In the late 1860s and early 1870s, a 
relatively severe smallpox epidemic afflicted most 
central European countries. Especially in countries 
without strict vaccination laws or regulations, the 
number of people suffering from smallpox rose. In 
Paris, the number of people who died from smallpox 
was only 119 in December of 1869, but rose to 983 
by the following summer.22 Smallpox appeared in var-
ious French cities, spreading throughout France and 
into Italy, Switzerland, and other neighbouring coun-
tries (Kübler, 1901, pp. 282-3, 287-90; Matzel, 1977, 
pp. 19-23, 46-51). During the Franco-Prussian War, 
from the summer of 1870 to the spring 1871, the 
movement of troops and people had a huge impact 
on the spread of the epidemic (Matzel, 1977).
Unlike German troops, French soldiers were not 
consistently re-vaccinated and as a result thousands 
of French soldiers came down with smallpox. Where-
as few German troops fell ill and only 27823 died, the 
French army lost over 23,400 soldiers. French civilians 
also suffered: over 200,000 people probably died of 
smallpox in France between 1869 and 1871 (Winkle, 
1997, p. 894). The outbreak of smallpox in the French 
army was regarded as one reason for the success of 
the German forces. 
But the smallpox epidemic was not limited to 
France. Fleeing civilians, French migrants and soldiers 
carried the disease to Switzerland and Belgium. In 
addition, the epidemic spread to Italy, England, and 
Sweden where it lasted until 1875. Behind the front 
lines, French prisoners infected the German civilian 
population that was often not re-vaccinated regularly 
or vaccinated at all (Blattern und Schutzpockenimp-
fung, 1896, pp. 63-6). The outbreak of smallpox in 
the aftermath of the war was the last smallpox epi-
demic in Germany, causing more than 181,000 fatal-
ities; by contrast, only 41,210 people died in the war 
itself.24 
In addition to reducing the population, epidemics 
also posed other biopolitical threats that concerned 
the Imperial Health Office. The smaller pool of po-
tential soldiers presented a major threat to national 
security. And epidemics doubtless also threatened 
public order. In addition, epidemics had economic 
consequences and hence needed to be prevented by 
any means necessary, as the Imperial Health Office’s 
publication “Blattern und Schutzpockenimpfung” em-
phasised: “Caring for the sick and controlling the dis-
ease demanded much money; during the epidemic, 
the labour force shrank and disease-related invalids 
had to be supported for the rest of their lives; and 
in total, the exchange of goods dropped and the na-
tional economy suffered as a consequence of the 
epidemic” (Blattern und Schutzpockenimpfung, 1896, 
p. 75-6, translation by ACH).
3.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMPERIAL 
VACCINATION LAW
In light of the catastrophic experiences of the last 
epidemic, government officials and parliamentarians 
debated compulsory (re-)vaccination against smallpox 
after the war. Although some German states had laws 
compelling the vaccination of children and while 
many governments promoted re-vaccination, regula-
tions were not strictly followed and violations went 
unpunished. Only when faced with epidemics did 
state officials become more assertive. Accordingly, 
the initial bill compelling vaccination and re-vaccina-
tion of all residents allowed authorities to enforce 
rigid measures after the outbreak of a smallpox epi-
demic. The implementation of these measures was 
supposed to have been enforced by fines or prison 
sentences for those who objected to preventive 
measures. 
Debate in the new German parliament and the 
press was heated. The National Liberal Party cam-
paigned for the individual rights of every person and 
complained that vaccination abridged people’s rights 
and well-being. Politicians of the Progressive Party 
discredited opponents of the compulsory vaccination 
law as reactionary, backward-looking, and anti-mod-
ernist. Furthermore, conservatives and the military 
doubted whether illiterate rural and lower classes 
could assess the benefits and risks of vaccination and 
emphasized that the state had the paternalistic duty 
to shield itself and the people from harm. The objec-
tions and arguments raised against coercive sanctions 
during the parliamentary debates led to various mod-
ifications that mitigated the bill. After long debate 
and many revisions, the bill passed into law and went 
into effect in 1874.25
The compromise found in the formulation of the 
Imperial Vaccination Law was typical of the consen-
sual tradition that characterized post-unification re-
lations between German states and political factions. 
At first glance, sanctions were reduced and mainly 
directed against vaccinators. At the same time, how-
ever, stricter laws in the federal states, for example 
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in Prussia, remained in effect.26 What was in the law? 
First, it required every infant to be vaccinated within 
a year of birth. Children were then re-vaccinated at 
around twelve years of age.27 As required by state 
law, every man entering military service was auto-
matically re-vaccinated. Second, the law stipulated 
that only trained physicians could vaccinate. Excep-
tions or deferments were only allowed for children 
in verifiably poor health. Eight days after the vacci-
nation, every child had to be presented to a physician 
to check whether the vaccination had succeeded. 
Furthermore, the physician had to certify the vacci-
nation and record it on official lists (Impflisten) to 
ensure that all the children in a district had been 
vaccinated. Both parents and vaccinators could be 
sanctioned. Non-authorized vaccinators could be 
fined up to 150 Mark or imprisoned for 14 days; vac-
cinators who failed to maintain adequate records or 
lists were fined up to 100 Marks; if the vaccination 
was conducted carelessly or in a grossly negligent 
manner that harmed the children, vaccinators could 
be imprisoned for three months or fined up to 500 
Marks,28 while anyone issuing false vaccination cer-
tificates could be prosecuted for forgery. On the other 
hand, parents unable to present a vaccination certif-
icate (if requested) for their children were subject to 
fines of twenty Marks; and those who prevented their 
children from being vaccinated could, after an official 
reminder, be fined fifty Marks and imprisoned for 
three days.29 The law remained in force until the 
1970s.30
While most German states could avail themselves 
of compulsory education to help carry out the law, 
the registration of births, marriages and deaths was 
still in the hands of the church. But this too changed 
during the so-called Kulturkampf between the Ger-
man government and the Catholic Church in the mid 
1870s. But as of 1876, following the enactment of 
the Civil Status Act of 1875, the state assumed re-
sponsibility for registering births, marriages and 
deaths. And since then, vaccination lists could be 
compiled using the public register of births main-
tained in every municipality (for a general overview 
Nipperdey, 1998).
Aiming to immunize the entire population against 
smallpox, the measures enacted were designed to 
prevent an epidemic. The Imperial Law and compul-
sory vaccination manifested a significant shift in em-
phasis from individual to public welfare. Whereas 
before 1874 citizens themselves assessed the advan-
tages and risks of vaccination, the new law saw public 
welfare trump personal choice. Adolf Kußmaul, a 
physician in the state of Baden, described this shift 
from individual choice to mandated coercion by way 
of an analogy: Wooden houses with incendiary thatch 
roofs were no longer allowed in cities not only be-
cause they endangered the owner’s home, but also 
primarily because they endangered the neighbouring 
houses and the city as such (quotation in Winkle, 
1997, p. 895). When vaccination was again called into 
question in the 1920s, the president of the Imperial 
Health Office continued to insist on compulsory vac-
cination. Effective protection of the Volkskörper (pub-
lic body) against a [small pox] epidemic could only 
be guaranteed by area-wide vaccination. „In prevent-
ing diseases, the common good takes precedence 
over individual rights“.31
Fig 1. Cover of a legal commentary (by Jacobi, 1875) to the Impe-
rial Vaccination Law
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4.  DISCUSSIONS AND CRITIQUE OF 
COMPULSORY VACCINATION
Passage and implementation of the law in 1874 was 
accompanied by harsh criticism from various social 
and political groups who vilified the law as a “com-
pulsory vaccination law” (Impfzwanggesetz).32 Anti-
cipating these critics, both the legislators who drafted 
the law and the government officials who enforced 
it tended to avoid direct compulsory measures, for 
instance against parents who failed to comply with 
follow-up examinations after the vaccination of their 
children or against individuals who, after the outbreak 
of an epidemic, had not yet been vaccinated. Instead 
of relying on the police to enforce these measures, 
officials preferred instead to fine people who resisted 
vaccination. Physicians became the primary agents of 
the measures. On the one hand, legally restricting the 
practice of vaccination to physicians helped drive 
medical professionalization (see Huerkamp, 1985; 
currently Thießen, 2017, 25-30). But as vaccinators, 
physicians also had to keep accurate records and lists 
and were held responsible for deleterious outcomes. 
The Law was designed to prevent physicians from 
issuing false certifications (to those objecting to vac-
cination) and to co-opt them into the state’s coercive 
vaccination policies, holding them responsible for 
ensuring that people on the vaccination lists showed 
up and were vaccinated.
Up until 1874, re-vaccination was voluntary in most 
federal states and the German Empire, even though 
state officials encouraged vaccination and introduced 
incentives and rewards to promote it. Even where 
vaccination was compulsory, it was not rigorously 
enforced (unless there was an epidemic) and people 
could still avoid having their children vaccinated. But 
after vaccination became obligatory in 1874, organ-
ized resistance grew. Whereas earlier resistance 
against inoculation and vaccination had been limited 
to small, local groups,33 by the second half of the 19th 
century and especially after passage of the Vaccina-
tion Law these groups collaborated to form a larger 
and well organized anti-vaccination movement that 
promoted public lectures and published pamphlets.34 
Members of the anti-vaccination movement hailed 
from both the working and educated classes – and 
many of the educated members were prominent in 
the so-called life-reform movement. 
Opponents of vaccination reiterated long-standing 
arguments, some of which dated back to the 18th 
century. They justified their opposition by stressing 
that vaccination undoubtedly had undesirable side 
effects, such as rashes, exanthema, erythema, inflam-
mation, or general symptoms of infection like fever, 
to say nothing of reported cases of death. In addition, 
child-to-child vaccination risked cross-infection: vac-
cinated children might also be infected with other 
pathogens like tuberculosis or syphilis.35 And more 
generally, young children also came down with mea-
sles, diphtheria, and other diseases after the vacci-
nation procedure.36 Sometimes opponents even ar-
gued that vaccination did not work at all and that 
children were harmed by the vaccine which in fact 
made them sick. These accusations were sometimes 
combined with conspiracy theories, for instance that 
vaccination was a plot to eradicate the working class. 
Opponents also repeatedly cited cases of severe side 
effects or sudden death, to the point where such cas-
es began to take on a life of their own.37
Eberhard Wolff has examined several of the medical 
concerns raised by opponents, including the vaccine’s 
side effects, especially in young children, its quality 
and efficacy, and generally its presumed necessity. 
Wolff also discusses non-medical arguments, includ-
ing opposition to state interference, the cost of vac-
cination, a reputed desire on the part of (lower class) 
parents to see their children die, or religious claims 
that vaccination was against God’s will.38 
Supporters of vaccination, including state author-
ities and members of the Progressive Party, de-
scribed and defamed opponents as careless and 
selfish (because they valued their own individual 
principles and interests above those of the common 
good), as illiterate and ignorant (for not knowing the 
background and necessity of vaccination), and as 
stubborn enemies of progress (for heeding religious 
objections).39
The whole story of vaccination has often been 
told as a story of medicalization, biopolitics, and 
biopower.40 Historians have recounted stories of 
the sick being disregarded as humans and treated 
as mere patients, of unvaccinated children threat-
ening public health, as citizens being overpowered 
by physicians in coalition with state authorities (or 
by the state in coalition with physicians). That said, 
smallpox vaccination has also been written as a 
story of medical success. Without doubt, people 
were medicalized, and both the expanding bureau-
cratic nation-state as well as institutionalized med-
icine took advantage of this process. But, from the 
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state’s perspective, the question arises as to how 
officials managed to generate trust in the very 
same vaccination measures that also provoked stri-
dent resistance? 
How did the German government react to this 
movement? How did medical officials react to reports 
about severe side effects and children who had died 
after vaccination? It was not enough simply to launch 
a public relations campaign. 
5.  THE IMPERIAL HEALTH OFFICE AND THE 
CONTROL OF VACCINE PRODUCTION
Discussions about compulsory vaccination took 
place against the backdrop of a German Empire that 
had been re-united in 1871 during the Franco-Ger-
man war. The empire was, as Thomas Nipperdey em-
phasises, above all a federal state. In other words, 
most of the political power resided in the hands of 
the German states, for instance in domestic, cultural, 
and public health affairs. Initially, the Empire had rel-
atively little (legislative and executive) authority, but 
over time it expanded its influence over the federal 
states (Nipperdey, 1998). The Empire and its institu-
tions focussed mainly on foreign affairs, defence, 
commerce, and standardization. Health care policy 
and the control of epidemics were left largely to the 
empire because epidemics often concerned more 
than one single state (Hüntelmann, 2008).
Prior to unification, German physicians had dis-
cussed the need for a federal public health agency 
to coordinate the activities of individual states. After 
the war, advocates petitioned Parliament, which re-
solved to found a public health institution what 
would later become the Imperial Health Office. In 
establishing that office, planners decided that it 
should also compile official statistics about compul-
sory vaccination and – after its establishment – to 
supervise the production of smallpox in the German 
Empire.41
Smallpox vaccines had generally been produced at 
various sites, such as semi-private companies or uni-
versities. But by the 1890s, smallpox vaccine was 
being produced in regional, state-run corporations 
regulated by law. The directors of these small farm-
like facilities were medical officers, responsible to the 
District President and ultimately to the federal states’ 
government.42
Fig 2. Plan of the Royal Vaccination Institute (provincial vaccine 
production site) in Halle (Source: Medizinische Anstalten, 1907)
Critics of vaccination charged that instead of be-
ing protected from one disease, children could be-
come infected with another. Human vaccine and 
arm-to-arm infection risked not only cross-infec-
tions but also unreliable quality and unpredictable 
side effects. Dating back to the 1820s, and espe-
cially after the epidemic in the 1870s, the mitiga-
tion of the humanised cowpox vaccine had been 
observed in a less developed pockmark (Kübler, 
1901) – and was often indicated in many epidemic 
victims. But vaccinated individuals reacted more 
strongly to original cowpox vaccine, still rarely 
available, and showed slight signs of infection and 
scaring. Furthermore, it was difficult to obtain cow-
pox lymph because the epizootic occurred only 
sporadically. Although a procedure to transmit 
cowpox in cattle had been developed in the 1840s 
in Italy, it took time before the animal lymph was 
produced systematically and in larger quantities. 
Since the mid-1860s, commercial institutes in 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Prussia (Berlin), 
and Hamburg had produced and distributed animal 
lymph. Similar institutes had been founded in Stutt-
gart, Munich, and Leipzig at the end of the 1870s. 
They produced a vaccine using calf-lymph. Diluted 
in water and conserved with glycerine, this vaccine 
was easy transferable and regarded just as effective 
as human lymph.43 At this point, the Imperial 
Health Office entered the scene.
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State medical officials, under the guidance of Rob-
ert Koch, investigated effective and safe modes of 
production, established and implemented proce-
dures to test vaccine quality and efficacy, and eval-
uated the potential risks and side effects of the new 
vaccine. In 1884, an Imperial Health Office commis-
sion recommended the introduction of vaccine 
based on animal lymph throughout the Empire; and 
one year later the Federal Council resolved that 
eventually only animal lymph should be used for 
smallpox vaccination. In addition, the Council decid-
ed to create state-run institutes to supply enough 
animal lymph to meet the country’s demand for 
smallpox vaccine.44
A number of biopolitical measures were imple-
mented to limit the prospective public health risks of 
small pox vaccination. These measures were imple-
mented (and justified!) to protect the population 
from harmful vaccine (or harmful vaccination proce-
dures), to ensure the supply of sufficient and effective 
vaccine, and thus to prevent the outbreak of smallpox 
epidemics. But these safety measures were also im-
plemented to stabilize smallpox vaccination as a 
prophylactic and biopolitical measure. Each new re-
port of side effects or a child’s death – terrible as 
they were – damaged the reputation of vaccination 
as a preventive public health measure. From the gov-
ernment’s perspective, the anti-vaccination move-
ment’s exploitation of these reports threatened pub-
lic vaccination policies. Testing the quality and efficacy 
of animal lymph and producing standardized vaccine 
in state-run institutions were thus key public health 
policies.
No less important was the actual administration of 
the vaccine. Since 1874, only trained physicians were 
allowed to perform vaccinations – preferably medical 
officers and district physicians. One of them, M. 
Schulz, District Physician and head of the Royal Vac-
cine Institute in Berlin, published a manual about the 
“vaccination policy” (Impfgeschäft).45 Physicians were 
assigned districts in which they were allowed to per-
form vaccinations.46 At the beginning of each year, 
police and the civil registry office compiled so-called 
vaccination-lists of all new-born children, of children 
who had been deferred for medical reasons, and of 
families who had recently moved to the district. Fur-
thermore, officials compiled re-vaccination lists of 
twelve-year-old children. Official dates for vaccina-
tions and follow-up examinations were set and the 
lists were then handed over to the physicians.47 In 
villages and districts that had been plagued with diph-
theria, scarlet, measles, spotted fever, or other infec-
tious diseases, vaccination was suspended. Further-
more, children of families (or homes) that had been 
affected by these or other diseases, or that suffered 
from smallpox, were also excluded from vaccination 
for the year (Schulz, 1891, pp. 50-2; Kirchner, 1911, 
pp. 48-52).
From the 1890s, physicians were supplied with 
animal lymph from state-run institutes.48 After a 
physical examination, the children were vaccinated 
using at least four incisions. Martin Kirchner empha-
sized that physicians needed to take the same pre-
cautions they did for surgical operations, including 
the disinfection of hands, surfaces, and instruments 
(Jochmann, 1913, pp. 182-4; Kirchner, 1911, pp. 47-
8). After vaccination, there was a follow-up exami-
nation some six to eight days later. If at least one 
of the four incisions developed a full blister, the 
vaccination was deemed a success (Jochmann, 1913, 
pp. 182-4, 187; Kirchner, 1911, pp. 47-8, 52; Schulz, 
1891, pp. 57-8).
Fig 3. Form for vaccination certificate (Source: Medizinische An-
stalten, 1907)
The whole procedure was accompanied by paper 
work. As mentioned, the vaccinator issued a vaccina-
tion certificate to the parents (see Fig. 3). He also 
wrote a report about the vaccination locale, whether 
families with infectious diseases were reported, 
whether and how many children failed to appear, 
whether the original lists compiled by the civil registry 
office had been in proper order, or whether any un-
foreseen difficulties had arisen. In addition, he com-
pleted a vaccination list with the names of the vac-
cinated children, the type and source of lymph used 
(enabling traceability), and whether any complica-
tions or side effects arose. The lists were then revised 
and compiled by district physicians and submitted to 
the Imperial Health Office.49
Based on these submissions, Imperial Health Office 
officials wrote annual reports and compiled “vaccina-
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tion” statistics (Impfstatistik) that accounted for the 
number of people vaccinated, side-effects, and deaths 
and that were published in the scientific journal of 
the Imperial Health Office as “Results of vaccination 
policy” (Ergebnisse des Impfgeschäfts). Besides the 
“Vaccination Statistics” another “Statistics on small 
pox fatalities” existed that was published since 1905 
simply as “Smallpox Statistics”.50 The production fa-
cilities were also audited by Imperial Health Office 
officials, who reported on the annual activity of the 
vaccine plant, the production process, and vaccina-
tion campaigns.51
Fig 5. Cover page of the report „Results of vaccination policy“ for 
1884 (Source Arbeiten aus dem Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamte 2 
(1887), pp. 298 summarizing the number of vaccinated an re-vac-
cinated persons
6.  THE MORAL ECONOMY OF VACCINATION IN 
THE GERMAN EMPIRE
Twenty years after the law on compulsory vaccina-
tion was implemented, the Imperial Health Office 
published a memorandum on smallpox and preven-
tive vaccination, evaluating its benefits and discussing 
its risks and public criticisms. Unsurprisingly, the of-
fice concluded that compulsory vaccination had been 
very successful: new epidemics had not been regis-
tered ergo had been prevented, and smallpox cases 
were few and far between (and could often be traced 
back to foreigners or opponents of vaccination). Even 
though side effects were registered, except for a few 
unclear cases of death, none of them could be attrib-
uted to vaccination. These tragic accidents were 
chalked up as sacrifices for the common good, just 
as citizens had come to accept the small risk (1 in 
2.000 cases) of dying under chloroform anaesthesia 
(Blattern und Schutzpockenimpfung, 1896).
Following the controversial public and parliamen-
tary debates in the lead-up to the law on compulsory 
vaccination, strong public scepticism about vaccina-
tion remained after the bill was passed. But neither 
in the 1890s nor after the turn of the century, when 
Fig 4. Results of Vaccination Statistics for babies up to one year 
old (those vaccinated for the first time – Erstimpflinge), summa-
rized in Blattern und Schutzpockenimpfung, 1896, p. 89. The first 
column shows the German federal states and Prussian provinces; 
the second column shows the number of total registered vaccine 
recipients; column 3 shows the number of vaccine recipients that 
had to be vaccinated for the first time; column 4 shows the number 
of those who were vaccinated (and column 5 the percentage in 
relation to column 3); column 6 showed the number of those that 
were considered to be vaccinated successfully (and column 7 the 
percentage in relation to those vaccinated); and the last two col-
umns showed the number of those that were vaccinated with 
animal lymph. Another statistics (p. 90) summarized the results for 
school children (those re-vaccinated)
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compulsory vaccination in Britain had been scrapped, 
or during the 1920s, when heated debates about 
compulsory vaccination arose again, critics were suc-
cessful and compulsory vaccination remained valid. 
So, why were critics not able to convince public and 
parliament or, why were German authorities success-
ful with its vaccination politics of prevention? 
After the last smallpox epidemic in Germany, the 
contrast between those re-vaccinated (mostly sol-
diers) staying well and healthy and those, who had 
not been (re-)vaccinated and fell ill, was striking, and 
the absence of smallpox epidemics later on and the 
decreasing number of infections in the following years 
might have convinced some critics. Further on, critics 
of interventionist public health measures usually orig-
inated (in countries other than Germany) from the 
political left. But in the German Empire, Social Dem-
ocrats and members of the Progressive Party en-
dorsed in large parts bacteriological hygiene meas-
ures and only smaller political groups criticized 
compulsory vaccination. And although vocal, the an-
ti-vaccination movement represented only a marginal 
subcultural movement, according to Baldwin (1999, 
p. 548-9).
For sure, the sources asserting a decreasing number 
of infections and emphasizing the success of vaccina-
tion, were official reports or written by authors work-
ing in governmental institutions and they represent 
the views of state officials advocating vaccination. 
They argued that epidemics claimed the lives of many 
peoples, undermined military strength, and threat-
ened public order and the national economy. Epidem-
ics not only cost many lives but also substantial 
amounts of money due to lost production or the 
collapse of regional markets. These costs were bal-
anced against those of the administration of smallpox 
vaccinations and other healthcare policies: salaries of 
district physicians and medical officers, the costs of 
compiling and evaluating lists and data, and of estab-
lishing and maintaining the institutes producing ani-
mal lymph (see also Baldwin, 1999, p. 534, 550). From 
the perspective of the German government, these 
costs paid for themselves. The number of smallpox 
infections decreased rapidly and only rarely figured 
in the statistics. Whereas in 1889 about 200 people 
were still dying of smallpox, after 1894 fatalities in 
the Empire never rose above 100 (in 1910: 33 out of 
a population of 65 Mio) (Kirchner, 1911, pp. 60-2).
But next to an economic rationale existed a moral 
economy concerned with the most convincing argu-
ments.52 Officials hoped that research on vaccination 
techniques, the supervision of production sites, as 
well as the annual publication of statistics would 
counter scepticism about vaccination. Transparent 
government policies, they hoped, would engender 
public trust.53 In addition, statistics could help demon-
strate the positive effects of the vaccination campaign 
as rates of infections and fatalities fell after the in-
troduction of compulsory vaccination.54 Statistics also 
helped the government evaluate and legitimate its 
own policies by weighing the costs of vaccination 
against its benefits. And finally, the government could 
point to putatively objective statistical figures in de-
bunking rumours and countering the baseless asser-
tions of the anti-vaccination movement.
Theodore M. Porter has argued that the use of sta-
tistics, as a social technique of producing objectivity, 
arose in the 19th century (Porter, 1986; Porter, 1995). 
Although the pros and cons of medical statistics were 
still being hotly debated in the 1870s (Hüntelmann, 
2019), the collection, compilation, and transforma-
tion of data according to exact mathematical rules, 
as well as the use of those data in public discourse, 
created its own (convincing) moral economy of argu-
ments (Daston, 1995). In this respect, the collection 
of data, the analysis of mortality rates, and their pub-
lic discussion worked as a technology of trust (Porter). 
Alongside coercive measures, the German state tried 
to convince the population by using „objective“ ar-
guments (as a concession to growing demands for 
democratic governance). As a consequence, debates 
about compulsory vaccination became debates about 
quantitative facts and figures; whoever could best 
marshal not just convincing arguments, but also nu-
meric figures stood to gain politically.55 The statistical 
production of knowledge on which these arguments 
rested was a complex and elaborate process, but in 
the end the efforts seem to have paid off: within a 
scientifically grounded moral economy, medical offi-
cials simply had the more convincing arguments.
Vaccination was a preventive measure used to con-
trol smallpox. The control of epidemics (the protec-
tion of citizens, the maintenance of public order and 
the national economy) was regarded as a pre-eminent 
task of the modern state and compulsory vaccination 
as a serious infringement of individual rights was, like 
other public health measures, driven by biopolitical 
motives. Regardless of the immediate human cost, 
epidemics threatened military and economic power, 
public life, as well as law and order. In other words, 
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NOTAS
1 Parts of this paper have been presented at a conference 
on “Vaccination, Society and Politics” in Berlin in April 2011 
and at a conference about “Vaccines: Values, Past and 
Present” in Uppsala in November 2017. I would like to 
thank the unknown reviewers for their comment.
2 The case was reported in the first and only volume of the 
yearbook Anti-Vaccinator. Illustriertes Jahrbuch des inter-
nationalen Impfgegner-Bundes, published in Leipzig in 
1911 and edited by Heinrich Molenar, who also wrote the 
article on Impfschäden (vaccine damages), pp. 122-4. The 
case of Willy Otto has been recounted in various other 
publications and was analysed by Wolff, 1996, pp. 87-8.
3 See the classic account of Crookshank, 1889. For more 
recent accounts Smith, 1987; and Brunton, 2008.
4 In contrast to Britain, see Williamson, 2007.
5 Thus also Thießen, 2017, p. 13. All studies on smallpox 
prevention in Germany refer to the comprehensive over-
view of Kübler, 1901. In the 20th century some smaller 
medical dissertations have been published, like Matzel, 
1977. With the rise of social history, historians have em-
phasized the influence on politics and the importance of 
epidemics for society and state building. See for example, 
Huerkamp, 1985; and Wolff, 1998, who focussed on the 
introduction of vaccination in Wurttemberg in the early 
19th century; or most recently, Thießen, 2017, p. 9, who 
conceptualizes the history of immunisation in Germany as 
a history of the welfare state.
6 Most histories of smallpox deal with a larger period of time 
treating Europe as a whole, like Kübler, 1901; and recently 
Hopkins, 2002; and Williams, 2011. Smallpox epidemics 
and prevention have also been presented as part of broad-
er histories of epidemics and their influence on politics, 
society, economy and culture. See for example, Vasold, 
1991; Winkle, 1997; Baldwin, 1999; or Dinges and Schlich, 
1995.
7 Thießen, 2017, doesn’t begin his account until the great 
debates about compulsory vaccination in the 1870s. Huer-
kamp, 1985, has interpreted smallpox vaccination as a “first 
step in the medicalization of a broader public”.
8 Regarding the relationship between the state and disease, 
this contribution builds on Huerkamp, 1985; Dinges 1995; 
and especially Baldwin, 1999.
9 In China and India, other forms of prophylactic inoculation 
had been practised, see Parish, 1965, p. 21.
10 See Parish, 1965, pp. 21-2. In some regions of England, 
Wales, Scotland, North America, and Germany, layman also 
had practical knowledge about protection. See Kübler, 
1901, pp. 115-8; for the USA see Kotar and Gessler, 2013, 
pp. 33-45.
11 For the German state Wurttemberg, see Wolff, 1998, pp. 
102-8; for the USA, see Kotar and Gessler, 2013, pp. 
33-45.
12 For further information, see Crookshank’s classic text 
(1889), chap. V; Parish, 1965, pp. 24-5. Before Jenner in 
England, Benjamin Jesty and John Fewster had inoculated 
cowpox material to prevent smallpox, as had Peter Plett 
in Holstein. For Britain, see Pead, 2003; and Thurston and 
Williams, 2015; for Holstein, see Plett, 2006.
13 The concept and practice of vaccination spread throughout 
Europe. For German states, see Blattern und Schutzpock-
enimpfung, 1896; Kübler, 1901, pp. 174-9; for Wurttem-
berg see Wolff, 1998, pp. 109-21. By 1800, the publications 
of Jenner and other vaccinators like William Woodville and 
George Pearson had been translated into German. See the 
list of publications in Kübler, 1901, p. 166. 
14 Kübler, 1901, chap. VIII; Parish, 1965, pp. 27-9; Winkle, 
1997, pp. 887-8. In most German states the vaccine was 
free of charge for children and paupers to promote the 
dissemination of vaccination practices, see Huerkamp, 
1985, pp. 622-3. 
15 More systematic use of vaccination occurred in various 
waves. In particular, the number of vaccinated children 
rose after an outbreak of a smallpox epidemic. See Wolff, 
1998, pp. 109-24.
16 According to Rupp, 1975, p. 108, the (small) institute had 
four beds and children stayed for 22 days to ensure that 
they could also serve as a lymph-donors.
17 See Baldwin, 1999, pp. 254-5. In 1819 for instance, Ham-
burg expanded compulsory vaccination from children living 
in public institutions to all children of families supported 
by poor relief. Similar rules had been promulgated for Prus-
sia in 1835.
controlling epidemics helped stabilising the political 
system. Peter Baldwin has emphasized that the poli-
tics of (smallpox) prevention in Prussia (as in other 
countries) often were not just interventionist – com-
pulsory vaccination was accompanied by various safe-
ty measures such as research on vaccines, the super-
vision of production sites and the deployment of 
medical statistics on smallpox. The politics of small-
pox prevention encompassed preventive measures in 
two respects: not only did they aim to prevent the 
outbreak of an epidemic but to generate trust in vac-
cination and prophylactic measures designed to limit 
the risks of compulsory measures – measures that, 
in turn, sought to minimize the risk of disease and 
thus enhance the efficacy of the wider public health 
system. And within a moral economy of epidemic 
control these measures, anticipating potential resis-
tance, seemed to have helped to convince the 
public. 
SMALLPOX VACCINATION IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE.VACCINATION BETWEEN BIOPOLITICS AND MORAL ECONOMY 
Asclepio. 72(1), enero-junio 2020, p292. ISSN-L: 0210-4466, https://doi.org/10.3989/asclepio.2020.01 13
18 According to Rupp, 1975, p. 110, in August of 1807 Hes-
sen-Kassel was the first German territory to implement 
compulsory vaccination. But Hessen-Kassel is not men-
tioned in Kübler, 1901. 
19 Contemporaries discussed whether and why the efficacy 
of humanised cow lymph had declined over time as well 
as with every arm-to-arm vaccination.
20 See Kübler, 1901, pp. 228-9. According to Kübler, in the 
Grand Duchy of Hessen-Darmstadt re-vaccination was not 
implemented until 1869. But according to Rupp (1975, p. 
119), it is unclear whether soldiers were revaccinated, reg-
ularly or generally, after joining the army.
21 According to Bismarck, 1898/1928, p. 370, during the Aus-
tro-Prussian war 6,427 soldiers died of cholera, whereas 
4,450 died in combat. See also Winkle, 1997, p. 211. Ac-
cording to Matzel, 1977, p. 7, during the Franco-Prussian 
War one quarter of all fatalities were attributable to dis-
eases and, in general, more soldiers died of disease than 
in combat. 
22 See Kübler, 1901, pp. 282-3. According to Matzel, 1977, p. 
20, in Paris the number of fatalities amounted to more 
than 1,000 in July 1870, rising to 1,800 in November and 
December of 1870 (p. 22).
23 See Winkle, 1977, p. 894; but Matzel, 1977, p. 8 cites 297 
smallpox fatalities.
24 See Winkle, 1997, p. 894. Matzel, 1977, reports different 
figures: 150,000 fatalities due to smallpox and 48,000 sol-
diers who died during the war, of whom 9,000 died of 
typhoid fever.
25 The debate is summarised in Baldwin, 1999, pp. 260-70; 
Wolff, 1996; Thießen, 2017, pp. 42-59. Baldwin, 1999, pp. 
526-36, concluded that different strategies of preventive 
(and in this case restrictive) public health measures like 
vaccination could be more easily sorted along lines of po-
litical parties (liberals vs. conservative) than national states. 
In Germany, the Progressive Party with Rudolf Virchow as 
one of its leading proponents played a special role in the 
debate about vaccination as it was both: politically liberal 
and scientifically progressive, supporting vaccination. The 
objections and arguments against compulsory vaccination 
will be discussed below.
26 The subtitle of the commentary by C. Jacobi (1875) on the 
Imperial Vaccination Law illustrates this point: Das Reichs -
Impf-Gesetz vom 8. April 1874. Nebst Ausführungs-Bestim-
mungen des Bundesraths und den in Geltung gebliebenen 
Landes-Gesetzen über Zwangs-Impfungen bei Pocken- 
Epidemien. Nach Materialien des Reichstags dargestellt.
27 In the first draft of the law, compulsory vaccination was 
foreseen upon the outbreak of an epidemic. Although this 
part of the law had been rejected during the parliamentary 
debates, the adopted law contained a passage stipulating 
that regulations in individual states were still valid. See 
Blattern und Schutzpockenimpfung, 1896, p. 78. On the 
Imperial Vaccination Law, see idem, chap. 8; and Jacobi, 
1875.
28 And, as set forth in the Imperial Vaccination Law, they 
could also sued for physical injury.
29 For the Imperial Vaccination Law, see Blattern und 
Schutzpockenimpfung, 1896, chap. 8; and Jacobi, 1875. 
Although the financial penalty for parents was lower than 
that for physicians, fifty Marks was a lot for the working 
poor, whose average income barely amounted to 500 or 
600 Marks per year. In addition, the fine could be imposed 
repeatedly after each citation. See Blattern und Schutzpock-
enimpfung, 1896, p. 85.
30 The last smallpox infection in Germany was registered in 
1972. Compulsory vaccination for children was abandoned 
in 1975 and re-vaccination some years later. In 1980, the 
World Health Organisation declared smallpox eradicated. 
31 Speech of the President of the Imperial Health Office, Sten-
ographic Reports on the Proceedings of the German 
Reichs tag, 1st Parliamentary Term, 204th Session on 6th April 
1922. See furthermore the Report on the Scientific Foun-
dations of the Vaccination Law [Denkschrift über die wis-
senschaftlichen Grundlagen des Impfgesetzes] in the Fed-
eral Archive Berlin, R 86/4274. Regarding the interventionist 
(but inconsistent) strategy of Prussia, adopted later by the 
Empire and supported by bacteriologists, with a tendency 
to emphasize the public good over individual rights, see 
Baldwin, 1999, p. 546-8; Thießen, 2017, pp. 42-59.
32 Whereas German governments and advocates of vaccina-
tion spoke of Schutzpockenimpfung, implying a protective 
smallpox vaccination, members of the anti-vaccination 
movement used the term Zwangsimpfung, meaning com-
pulsory vaccination.
33 On early resistance to vaccination, see Kübler, 1901, pp. 
235-48.
34 In his introduction, Wolff, 1996, describes a speech given 
by Carl G.G. Nittinger, a prominent anti-vaccination agita-
tor, in a town hall with an audience reputed to have num-
bered more than 2,000 people. On this and the second 
half of the 19th century, see Wolff, 1996; Thießen, 2017, p. 
31-8.
35 These side effects were discussed in Kübler, 1901, pp. 
263-5. 
36 Later in the century, officials discussed children suffering 
from these and other diseases, especially scrofula and tu-
berculosis, and the fact that outbreaks were caused by 
weakened immune systems following vaccination. See ibid. 
Side effects and complications during and after vaccination 
were also discussed in the pro-vaccination literature, for 
instance systematically in Schulz, 1891, pp. 27-33.
37 See Schulz, 1891, p. 37; for more extensive accounts, see 
Blattern und Schutzpockenimpfung, 1896, pp. 96-124; Joch-
mann, 1913, pp. 197-216; Wolff, 1996; on early arguments, 
see Wolff, 1995. 
38 See Wolff, 1995; Wolff, 1996; on similar discussion in Brit-
ain, see Williamson, 2007.
39 See for instance the views of medical officers in Kübler, 
1901; or Kirchner, 1911. Paul Kübler was member of the 
Imperial Health Office who compiled the statistics about 
vaccination; Kirchner also worked as medical officer in the 
Imperial Health Office, before moving to the health division 
of the Prussian Ministry of Cultural Affairs and later be-
coming head of that division after it was moved to the 
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Prussian Ministry of Interior. Both parties, advocates and 
opponents of vaccination, accused one another of pursuing 
their own private business interests. See for example Joch-
mann, 1913, pp. 259-60. The debate summarized in Wolff, 
1996; and recently Thießen, 2017, pp. 42-59.
40 See especially Huerkamp, 1985. For an overview of the 
historiographic debates in the 1980s and 1990s on public 
health and medicalization, especially in Germany and 
France, see Loetz, 1994. On medicalization and bio-power 
in relation to bacteriology, see Bashford and Hooker, 2001; 
Bashford 2004; and the publications of Wolff. 
41 On the establishment of the Imperial Health Office, see 
Hüntelmann, 2008, chap. 2.
42 Kirchner, 1911 p. 40 counted 21 state-run vaccine insti-
tutes. Beside these were also private institutes under state 
supervision.
43 See Jochmann, 1913, pp. 175-6; for Hamburg Voigt, 1879.
44 See Jochmann, 1913, pp. 176; the federal regulations are 
published in Schulz, 1891, pp. 83-90; a detailed description 
about the production process is given in a report on the 
annual activity of the vaccine plant for 1894 in: 
Medizinal-Statistische Mittheilungen aus dem dem Kaiser-
lichen Gesundheitsamte 1 (1895), p. 1-44. 
45 See Schulz, 1891. The German term “Geschäft” denotes 
both a business and a practice.
46 The size of the vaccination districts were designed to make 
them easily accessible to all inhabitants of the district. 
47 The official dates often aligned with holidays. In rural areas, 
officials suggested setting it after harvest time, see Schulz, 
1891, pp. 48-51.
48 On the production of calf-lymph at the institutes, see Joch-
mann, 1913, pp. 177-81; Kirchner (1911, pp. 40-4). In rare 
cases where arm-to-arm vaccinations was still practiced, 
the physicians had to start early enough to vaccinate all 
children registered on the list.
49 See Schulz, 1891, pp. 59-61, including the standard forms 
used for vaccination certificates and lists in annex 3-11.
50 In the second volume (1887) of the Results/Works of the 
Imperial Health Office, the vaccination statistics for the 
previous year were published for the first time, cf. Ergeb-
nisse einer Statistik der Pockentodesfälle für das Deutsche 
Reich. In: Arbeiten aus dem Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamte 
2 (1887). From that point onward, vaccination statistics 
were published annually. Reports of the state-run vaccine 
institutes that produced animal lymph were published for 
the first time in 1889, cf. Tätigkeitsberichte der staatlichen 
Anstalten zur Herstellung von Tierlymphe. In: Arbeiten aus 
dem Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamte 5 (1889). Later on these 
statistics and reports were published in a new statistical 
journal of the Imperial Health Office, the Medical Statistical 
Reports (Medizinalstatistische Mittheilungen des Kaiserli-
chen Gesundheitsamtes). The statistics were introduced by 
a report discussing cases involving severe side effects or 
death. In the tenth volume of the Medical Statistical Re-
ports in 1904, the data were presented as “vaccination 
statistics about fatalities” (Pockentodesfallstatistik), but in 
the following volume for 1905 the simply as “smallpox 
statistics” (Pockenstatistik).
51 See for instance the report for 1888: “Die Thätigkeit der im 
Deutschen Reiche errichteten Anstalten zur Gewinnung von 
Tierlymphe während des Jahres 1888. Nach den Jahres-
berichten der Vorstände zusammengestellt im Kaiserlichen 
Gesundheitsamtes”. In: Arbeiten aus dem Kaiserlichen Ge-
sundheitsamte 6 (1890), pp. 43-88; later on reports were 
published in: Medizinal-Statistische Mittheilungen aus dem 
dem Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamte, the report for 1894 in 
Vol. 1 (1895), p. 1-44, including a discussion about side 
 effects and vaccine recipients supposed to be harmed by 
the vaccine (p. 38-40). In general Blattern und Schutzpock-
enimpfung, 1896.
52 The concept of moral economy was introduced by Edward 
P. Thompson (1971) classic text of the English working 
class. Referring to Thompson, “moral economy” is used to 
describe an economy commonly based on principles of 
mutuality that emphasize an embeddednes economy is 
embedded in social worlds and tied in with moral principles 
and social norms. Lorraine Daston (1995) modified and 
introduced this term into the history of science to explain 
how scientific objects were considered important, how 
certain arguments and methods were balanced and valued 
as trustful evidence, as more convincing than others in the 
process of knowledge production.
53 Thießen, 2017, discusses statistics as machines of evidence 
(Evidenzmaschinen pp. 88-92).
54 This is obvious in Kirchner’s statistics on smallpox fatalities 
between 1825 and 1908 in the Prussian population (mor-
tality per 100,000 inhabitants) and in the military. He clear-
ly delineated the introduction of compulsory vaccination 
in the army in 1834 and the Imperial Vaccination Law of 
1874, see Kirchner, 1911, p. 60.
55 Accordingly, Körösi, 1887; addressed the anti-vaccination 
movement’s critique of official statistics and rebutted their 
claims.
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